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COMMERCIAL LAW
Commercial Law
I. "CONTROLLING PERSONS" DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE
TO PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In Plowman v. Bagnal' the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to
extend the "controlling persons" doctrine to a private action initiated under the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA).2 The controlling
persons doctrine allows a court to hold an individual director or officer
personally liable for corporate acts that violate the SCUTPA.3 While the
doctrine has been recognized by South Carolina courts since 1982,4 applica-
tion of the doctrine has been limited to actions brought by the Attorney
General under section 39-5-50 of the SCUTPA. 5 Plowman represents the first
case in which the supreme court was forced to determine whether the doctrine
should be applied to private actions. By refusing to extend the doctrine to
private actions, the court has made it more difficult for private parties to
obtain relief from controlling individuals.
In Plowman the plaintiffs, homeowners in Village Pond subdivision,
initiated an unfair trade practices action against the corporate developer of the
subdivision and two individuals who were founders of the corporation. The
plaintiffs alleged that the corporate developer, through its agents, including the
two individual defendants, made various misrepresentations about the
subdivision in an effort to induce the plaintiffs to buy property in Village
Pond. The promised amenities were never realized. The plaintiffs sought to
apply the controlling persons doctrine to hold the individual defendants
personally liable for the damages resulting from the alleged violation of the
SCUTPA. 6
1. __ S.C. __, 450 S.E.2d 36 (1994).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
3. State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519,531, 313 S.E.2d 334,341 (Ct. App.
1984). A controlling person has been defined as "one who formulates and directs corporate
policy or who is deeply involved in the important business affairs of the corporation." Id.
4. In State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982), the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed summary judgment when an issue of fact existed concerning
the defendant's "role as a controlling person." Id. at 284, 294 S.E.2d at 782.
5. See id. at 281, 294 S.E.2d at 781; State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc'y Today, Inc.,
290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1986); State ex. rel. McLeod v. VIP Enters., 286 S.C.
501, 335 S.E.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1985); C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 519, 313 S.E.2d at 334. An
action based on a violation of the SCUTPA may be initiated either by the Attorney General or
by a private individual who has suffered a loss. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50, -110, -140 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
6. Plowman, - S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 37.
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Although the individual defendants were indeed controlling persons of the
corporate defendant, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a directed
verdict against the individual defendants on the ground that the controlling
persons doctrine was not applicable in a private action. The trial judge also
refused to charge the jury that controlling persons are personally liable based
on their status alone, holding that controlling persons could only be liable in
a private action under the SCUTPA if they personally violated the statute. The
jury found that only the corporation engaged in unfair and deceptive trade
practices that violated the statute. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the
doctrine should apply in a private action initiated under the SCUTPA to render
controlling persons liable as a matter of law for corporate violations.7
The court first examined the language of the SCUTPA, which declares
that unfair trade practices are illegal,' and that persons who violate the act are
subject to civil liability.9 "Person" is defined by SCUTPA as "natural
persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated
associations and any other legal entity."'" The court determined that the plain
language of SCUTPA requires a person to have actually used or employed an
illegal method or practice in order to violate SCUTPA, precluding control
person liability as a matter of law." The court then applied the settled
principle that corporate directors and officers are not liable for torts of a
corporation absent personal involvement and concluded that controlling
persons must personally violate the SCUTPA to be liable in actions arising
under it.'
2
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a failure to extend
control person liability would be inconsistent with the court's acceptance of
such liability in actions brought by the Attorney General. 13 The Plowman
court noted that application of the doctrine in public actions is consistent with
the doctrine's application by federal courts in public actions brought by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Federal Unfair Trade Practices
Act. In an FTC action, directors or officers of a corporation who are deemed
to be controlling persons may be individually included on cease and desist
orders.' 4 However, the court noted that because the federal act does not
7. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 37.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. S.C.CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
11. Plowman, _ S.C. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 37.
12. Id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 37-38.
13. See id. at , 450 S.E.2d at 38.
14. See Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (Ist Cir. 1973); Benrus
Watch Co. v. FrC, 352 F.2d 313, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1965). But see Barrett Carpet Mills, Inc.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 635 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that an officer
cannot be listed individually on a cease and desist order merely because he is an officer, but must
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provide for a private cause of action, it can be distinguished from the
SCUTPA. Furthermore, the court found no authority in the SCUTPA
indicating that the General Assembly intended to extend the doctrine to private
actions. 15
The court further justified its limitation of the application of the doctrine
to public actions only by focusing on the different policy rationales behind
public and private actions. The court noted that a government action is
designed "to punish or enjoin responsible individuals."16 Private actions, on
the other hand, are designed to compensate parties who suffer injury or loss
as a result of a guilty party's violations.17 Because the rationale underlying
each type of action is different, the court reasoned that the same application
of the doctrine was not appropriate for both." The court concluded that
greater public interests are involved in government actions; therefore,
principles of control person liability should be given stronger effect when
public, rather than private, interests are at stake.19 Thus, "in private actions
under the UTPA, directors and officers are not liable for the corporation's
unfair trade practices unless they personally commit, participate in, direct, or
authorize the commission of a violation of the UTPA." 20
Justices Toal and Finney dissented, contending that the majority's
distinction between public and private actions was unfounded21 and effective-
ly created two definitions of "person" for purposes of the SCUTPA. 2
According to the dissent, such a distinction is not in accord with South
Carolina's statutory scheme, which provides a more expansive unfair trade
practices act than the federal version. Furthermore, "if the General Assembly
intended for 'person' to mean one thing for a private cause of action and
have actively participated in the violation, if the violation is not likely to recur).
Section 39-5-20(b) instructs state courts to be guided by the FTC in interpreting § 39-5-20(a).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
15. Plowman, __ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
16. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
17. See id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
18. See id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50(b) (Law. Co-op.
1985) (providing that in SCUTPA actions brought by the Attorney General, courts may order
restitution to a party that has suffered an ascertainable loss due to a violation of the SCUTPA,
thus providing for a form of private compensation in a public action).
19. See Plowman, _ S.C. at, 450 S.E.2d at 38. But see Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan,
298 S.C. 210, 379 S.E.2d 289 (1989); Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton
Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting that a private plaintiff
must show that the alleged unfair or deceptive act or practice has adversely impacted on the
public interest).
20. Plowman, S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
21. See id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 39-40 (Toal, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 40.
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another for an action by the Attorney General, it could have so provided."'
Because the legislature did not create separate definitions, the dissent argued
that the South Carolina courts' definition of "person" as including "controlling
persons" should apply in both public and private actions.' The dissent also
asserted that whether individuals should be held personally liable as controlling
persons should be a jury determination.
The court's decision in Plowman v. Bagnal could have a significant
impact on commercial dealings because it lessens consumer protection
available under a SCUPTA private cause of action. Individuals will find it
more difficult to recover against the directors and officers of corporations that
have violated the act because they will need to establish that the director or
officer personally violated the statute. After Plowman, an individual may have
a better chance of obtaining full recovery through the restitutionary measures
provided for in an action initiated by the Attorney General than under a private
cause of action.
Cynthia A. Smith
II. PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE HELD SUPERIOR TO LIENS
FOR PAST DUE ASSESSMENTS
In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bailey' the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the judgment liens of a homeowners association for
unpaid assessments were subordinate to the prior lien of a first mortgagee. The
mortgage in question was recorded after the homeowners association's
covenants, but before the association levied the assessments giving rise to its
lien.' The court rejected the homeowners association's contention that its lien
for unpaid assessments related back to the filing of the covenants. 3
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Charleston (First Federal)
brought an action to foreclose its mortgage on real property owned by Arthur
N. Bailey and James Michael Manney.4 First Federal included Treeloft Villas
23. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 40.
24. See id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 40. In addition, the subject matter of the lawsuit was found
to be relevant in light of the trend in recent years to expand liability of developers and builders
in the area of new residential housing. Further, Justice Toal noted that in C & L Corp., a case
in which the facts were remarkably similar, the principals of the developer corporation were
subject to personal liability under the SCUTPA as controlling persons. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d
at 40.
1. - S.C. _, 450 S.E.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at _,450 S.E.2d at 79.
3. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 80-81.
4. Id. at __,450 S.E.2d at 79.
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Homeowners Association (Treeloft) as a defendant because Treeloft held
judgment liens against the property for past due assessments. Treeloft
maintained that its liens were superior to the mortgage lien. The master held
that First Federal had priority, relying on "the principle that 'a purchase
money mortgage will ordinarily be given priority over security interests in
realty arising through the mortgagor.'"'
Covenants of Treeloft Villas Homeowners Association (Covenants) were
recorded in the Charleston county R.M.C. Office on August 24, 1978. First
Federal recorded its mortgage there on April 18, 1979. Subsequently, Treeloft
secured several judgments against the defendants for unpaid assessments.6
The covenants required that maintenance assessments be paid by each
owner and that such assessment "shall be a charge and continuing lien on the
lots against which each assessment is made. "7 Assessments were deemed
delinquent if not paid within thirty days after becoming due.' The covenants
also provided that they would "'run with and bind the land and... enure [sic]
to the benefit of and be enforceable by the Association.' ' First Federal's
mortgage recited that it was taken subject to the provisions of the Cove-
nants. 10
The court of appeals first determined that Treeloft's right to a lien on the
property did not arise through First Federal's mortgagors. Rather, the court
held that Treeloft's right was created by the covenants prior to the time the
mortgagors received title. The court thus concluded that First Federal's
mortgage was held subject to Treeloft's right to impose a lien for unpaid
assessments, and that the mortgage's "subject to" language merely recognized
this fact. 1 The court then turned to the question of when Treeloft's charge
or lien actually arose. Noting that the assessments were a "'charge and
continuing lien on the lots against which each such assessment is made' . . .
[and] delinquent if not paid within 30 days after becoming due," 12 the court
framed the issue as "whether amounts assessed by the association which
became past due 30 days after assessed constitute a lien recognizable at law
5. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 79.
6. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 79. Judgments in favor of Treeloft were entered
on August 9, 1986, August 30, 1989, December28, 1990, and June 9, 1992. Id. at _ n. 1, 450
S.E.2d at 79 n.1.
7. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 79.
8. Id. at _,450 S.E.2d at 80.
9. Id. at _,450 S.E.2d at 79.
10. Id. at _ n.3, 450 S.E.2d at 80 n.3.
11. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 80 (citing South Carolina Fed. Say. Bank v.
San-A-Bel Corp., 307 S.C. 76, 413 S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1992)).
12. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 80.
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which relates back to the time of the filing of the covenants or whether such
lien is prospective only."' 3
The court focused on the terms of the covenants and found that they did
not "purport to subject specific property to a lien or charge as security for
payment of a present debt owed by a lot owner."" 4 The court also pointed out
that the covenants did not provide a method for enforcing payment of the
assessment lien, nor did the lien created have priority over other liens and
claims.15 On the basis of these findings the court stated that Treeloft would
have to resort to equity to secure its claim to the foreclosure proceeds,
apparently concluding that Treeloft had no lien recognizable at law relating
back to the filing of the covenants.' 6
The court briefly considered the nature of a lien or charge in equity and
stated that an equitable lien requires "a debt owing from one person to
another, specific property to which the debt attaches, and an intent, expressed
or implied, that the property will serve as security for the payment of the debt.
.. [A]n equitable lien relates back in time to its creation by the conduct of
the parties."" 7 Assuming that the covenants sufficiently identified specific
property to which an equitable lien could attach, the court asked "what then
is the conduct of the parties that actuates the association's charge or lien?"' 8
The court concluded that the lot owner's failure to pay assessments when due
created the lien. The court thus held that Treeloft's judgments for assessments
constituted "liens against the property only from the time the amounts of the
respective assessments represented by the judgments were fixed and became
due." 9 Because the assessments which were the basis for Treeloft's judg-
ments were fixed subsequent to First Federal's mortgage, the court held that,
even in equity, First Federal's mortgage lien had priority.2"
The dissent viewed First Federal's mortgage as subordinate to Treeloft's
lien, reasoning that because First Federal took its mortgage with full
knowledge of Treeloft's covenants, First Federal was bound by the terms of
the covenants. 2 The dissent believed such an outcome would be fair and
equitable because assessments for the maintenance of common properties
13. Id. at ,450 S.E.2d at 80.
14. Id. at __,450 S.E.2d at 80.
15. Id. at __,450 S.E.2d at 80.
16. Bailey, _ S.C. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 80.
17. Id. at , 450 S.E.2d at 80-81 (citing Fibkins v. Fibkins, 303 S.C. 112, 399 S.E.2d 158
(Ct. App. 1990) and Perpetual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Willingham, 296 S.C. 24, 370 S.E.2d
286 (Ct. App. 1988)).
18. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 81.
19. Id. at __,450 S.E.2d at 81 (citing St. Paul Fed. Bank For Say. v. Wesby, 501 N.E.2d
707 (ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1987)).
20. Id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 81.
21. Bailey, _ S.C. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 82 (Littlejohn, Acting J., dissenting).
[Vol. 47
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increased the value of First Federal's mortgage.' Moreover, the dissent
emphasized that if the cost of maintaining common properties was not assumed
by First Federal it would have to be assumed by other lot owners. This result
would be undesirable because a mortgagee is in a superior position to protect
itself against the possibility of assumed assessments by adjusting the loan
amount to fit the appraisal.'
Courts in several other jurisdictions have considered the priority of an
assessment lien against a mortgage obtained after the recording of the
covenants but before the assessments giving rise to the lien were made. The
majority of these cases reach the same conclusion as the Bailey court.24 In all
of these cases, the wording of the covenants creating the association's right to
make assessments was critical in determining whether the lien for unpaid
assessments would relate back to the recording date of the covenants. The
Bailey court also relied upon the wording of the covenants.' Had the
covenants been more specific, the court likely would have allowed the relation
back.26
The court maintained that its decision was "in keeping with the spirit of
the law relative to the priority of common property assessment liens vis-a-vis
mortgage liens, " ' citing section 3-115 of the Model Real Estate Cooperative
22. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 82.
23. Id. at 450 S.E.2d at 82.
24. E.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson, 639 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994), review granted sub nom., Holy Lake Ass'n v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 650 So. 2d
990 (1995) (declaring that "in the absence of clear language giving a homeowners' association
a lien that relates back to previously recorded documents," the rule of "first in time is first in
right" applies); St. Paul Fed. Bank For Say. v. Wesby, 501 N.E.2d 707, 711 (I11. App. Ct.
1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1987) (finding nothing in the declaration that
supported the association's relation back argument); First Twinstate Bank v. Hart, 648 A.2d 820,
822 (Vt. 1993) (holding a mortgage lien superior to the landowners' association's assessment lien
because the covenants did not contain an express subordination clause). But see New York Life
Ins. & Annuity Corp. v. Hammocks Community Ass'n, 622 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (per curiam) (holding assessment lien had priority over prior mortgage where covenants
provided that assessment lien was to have priority over first mortgages amortized over a period
less than ten years); American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners' Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 581
(Wyo. 1991) (giving effect to a subordination clause contained in the covenants in order to allow
the assessment lien to relate back to the date of the filing of the covenants).
25. Bailey, __ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 80 (noting that the covenants do not "provide that
the charge or lien created has priority over other liens and claims").
26. The court stated that, "where the language imposing such covenants is unambiguous, the
covenants will be enforced according to their obvious meaning." Id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 79
(citing Shipyard Property Owners' Ass'n v. Mangiaracina, 307 S.C. 299, 414 S.E.2d 795 (Ct.
App. 1992)) (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 81.
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Ace' and section 3-116 of the Uniform Condominium Act29 for the proposi-
tion that liens for unpaid assessments should be subordinate to mortgages
recorded prior to the assessment delinquency." Contrary to the court's
assertion, the cited Uniform Acts contain a limited statutory preference for
assessment liens over mortgages. Under both acts an assessment lien is given
priority over all but first mortgages or first security interests. Furthermore,
even first mortgages or security interests are subordinate to an assessment lien
for up to six months of unpaid assessments."
The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act incorporates a six month
super-priority lien for unpaid assessments similar to those in the Uniform Acts
cited in Bailey.32 This super-priority lien reflects the policy of protecting the
financial vitality of private associations, which are now performing many
traditional government functions such as garbage collection and maintenance
of streets and parks. 3 When associations are hampered in their ability to
28. 7B U.L.A. 225 (1981).
29. 7 U.L.A. 421 (1980).
30. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 81. The court also quotes from the Horizontal
Property Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-210 (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("All sums assessed by the
administrator ... but unpaid ... shall constitute a lien on such apartment prior to all other liens
except only . . . (ii) mortgage and other liens, duly recorded, encumbering the apartment."). Id.
at _, 450 S.E.2d at 81.
31. The Uniform Condominium Act provides:
A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit
except... (ii) a first mortgage or deed of trust on the unit recorded before the date
on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent .... The lien is
also prior to the mortgages and deeds of trust described in clause (ii) above to the
extent of the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by
the association. .. which would have become due in the absence of acceleration
during the 6 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien.
UNIF. CONDOMINIM AcT § 3-116(b), 7 U.L.A. 527 (1980) (emphasis added); see also UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP Acr § 3-116(b), 7 U.L.A. 251 (1994 & Supp. 1995); MODEL
REAL ESTATE COOPERATiVE AcT § 3-115(b), 7A U.L.A. 306 (1981) (containing nearly identical
provisions regarding the priority of an assessment lien against a first security interest in a
cooperative interest).
32. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b), 7 U.L.A. 251 (1994 & Supp.
1995). This section provides in part:
A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit
except ... (ii) a first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which
the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent, or, in a cooperative, the first
security interest encumbering only the unit owner's interest and perfected before the
date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent ... The lien
is also prior to all security interests described in clause (ii) above to the extent of the
common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by the association
pursuant to Section 3-115(a) which would have become due in the absence of
acceleration during the 6 months immediately preceding institution of an action to
enforce the lien.
Id.
33. James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The "Super Priority"Lien
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collect assessments, the provision of important community services is
jeopardized and the burden of maintaining the community is placed
disproportionately on members who make timely payments.3
Naturally, mortgage lenders are concerned about the statutory priority for
assessment liens. These concerns are addressed by limiting the super-priority
lien to six months of assessments and by requiring associations to make
assessments on the basis of an annual budget. 5 Lenders have a variety of
other means of protecting themselves, and some added risk does not seem
unduly burdensome because assuring maintenance of common properties
benefits lenders by protecting the value of their collateral.3" The Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act thus strikes a compromise between the
interests of mortgage lenders and homeowners associations.
In Bailey the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the assessment
liens of a homeowners association were subordinate to a first mortgage
recorded after the homeowners association's covenants but before the
association levied the assessments giving rise to its lien. In refusing to find a
relation back, the court noted the covenant's failure to include a mechanism
for enforcing the association's lien and the covenant's failure to provide that
the association's lien had priority over other liens.37 Whether the
association's lien would have related back absent these omissions remains
unclear. The present uncertainty surrounding the priority positions of
mortgages vis-a-vis assessment liens could be resolved simply and fairly by
legislative enactment of the six month super-priority assessment lien proposed
by the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.38
Ronald B. Cox
and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 353, 361 (1992).
34. Id. at 359-60.
35. Id. at 361-62 (citing UNiP. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP AcT §§ 3-115(a), 3-116(b),
7 U.L.A. 349, 351 (1982) (amended 1994)).
36. See id. at 361-62 (suggesting that lenders can protect themselves by reducing the size of
the loan relative to the value of the collateral, requiring escrows, or obtaining mortgage
insurance). Cf. supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent in Bailey).
37. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 80.
38. For an excellent discussion of the UCIOA, see Winokur, supra note 33.
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III. COURT ALLOWS EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
FOR COTENANT PRIMARILY LIABLE AT LAW
In United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, Ltd.' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that when two cotenants are jointly and severally liable on a
mortgage debt, either cotenant's conveyance of the shared property shifts
primary liability to the property and the remaining cotenant becomes only
secondarily liable. 2  This shift of primary liability becomes crucial in an
action for equitable subrogation, where secondary liability is a necessary
element.'
Caroprop arose from a partition action instituted by United Carolina
Bank, as trustee under the individual retirement account of Lloyd D. Auten
(Auten IRA). Auten IRA sued Caroprop, its cotenant, and First South Savings
Bank, Inc. (First South), the second mortgagee of Caroprop's undivided
interest in the property.' Auten IRA and Atlantic Properties, Ltd. (Atlantic)
originally purchased the land from Interstate Investment Associates, III
(Interstate) as tenants in commons and gave Interstate a note secured by a first
mortgage on a portion of the property as part of the purchase price.6
Atlantic eventually conveyed its undivided interest in the property to
Caroprop. Caroprop did not assume liability on the Interstate note, but took
subject to Interstate's first mortgage. Caroprop then gave a second mortgage
to First South. When Caroprop failed to make payments on the Interstate
note, Interstate began foreclosure proceedings. To avoid foreclosure, Auten
IRA paid both its and Caroprop's share of the Interstate mortgage debt.7
Auten IRA subsequently instituted a partition action against Caroprop and
First South. Auten IRA argued that it was "entitled to be equitably subrogated
1. __ S.C. __, 446 S.E.2d 415 (1994).
2. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
3. In South Carolina, the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for equitable
subrogation are: (1) the party claiming subrogation has paid the debt; (2) the party was not a
volunteer but had a direct interest in the discharge of the debt or lien; (3) the party was second-
arily liable for the debt or for the discharge of the lien; and (4) no injustice will be done to the
other party by the allowance of the equity. Dedes v. Strickland, 307 S.C. 155, 158, 414 S.E.2d
134, 136 (1992) (citing Pee Dee State Bank v. Prosser, 295 S.C. 229, 236, 367 S.E.2d 708, 712-
13 (Ct. App. 1988)). The court in Dedes also noted that "the party asserting equitable
subrogation must not have had actual notice of the prior mortgage." Id.
4. United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, _ S.C. __, 429 S.E.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
__ S.C. __, 446 S.E.2d 415 (1994).
5. Caroprop, - S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 416.
6. Caroprop, - S.C. at_, 429 S.E.2d at 198. Auten IRA and Atlantic purchased a total
of 45.91 acres. The mortgage was secured by approximately 31 acres. Id. at __, 429 S.E.2d
at 198.
7. In addition, Auten IRA paid Caroprop's share of some past-due property taxes to prevent
the land from being sold at a tax sale. Caroprop, _ S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 416.
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to the rights of Interstate as the first mortgagee" because it had paid the entire
Interstate mortgage debt.' Caroprop defaulted on the complaint; First South
counterclaimed, seeking foreclosure of its mortgage on the property.9
In order to obtain equitable subrogation a party must be only secondarily
liable on a debt, must have paid the debt, and payment of the debt must have
been made as a party with a direct interest in its discharge and not as a
volunteer.10 Furthermore, equitable subrogation will not be granted if
injustice to the other party might result.1 The parties conceded that Auten
IRA met two of these elements; payment of the debt and a direct interest in the
discharge of the debt. 2 The master-in-equity, however, held that equitable
subrogation did not lie because Auten IRA was primarily, not secondarily,
liable on the first mortgage. 3
On appeal from the master, the court of appeals held that Auten IRA was
not entitled to equitable subrogation because Auten IRA's liability was primary
in that it was absolutely required to pay the entire Interstate debt regardless of
whether its cotenant made payments. 4 The note signed by Auten IRA and
Atlantic provided that each "'promise[d] to pay... Interstate... the sum of
[$966,042.00], together with interest . . . . '" Furthermore, as noted by the
court, South Carolina law provides that "[u]nless the instrument otherwise
specifies two or more persons who sign as maker, . . . and as a part of the
same transaction are jointly and severally liable . ,,16 Therefore, the
court of appeals held that Auten IRA could not satisfy the element of
secondary liability.' 7
8. Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 198. Auten IRA argued that in the alternative,
it was entitled to an equitable lien superior to First South's second mortgage. The basis of Auten
IRA's argument was that it acquired an inchoate lien when Atlantic and Auten IRA secured their
note to Interstate with a mortgage on the property but that the inchoate equitable lien became
complete when it paid the mortgage debt and taxes. The court of appeals held that the equitable
lien arose when Auten IRA paid the debt and was thus second in time behind First South's second
mortgage. The court would not consider whether Auten IRA was entitled to an equitable lien for
tax payments because it had not properly preserved the issue for appeal. Id. at __, 429 S.E.2d
at 199-200. The supreme court did not address this contention because it found Auten IRA was
entitled to equitable subrogation. See Caroprop, _ S.C. , 446 S.E.2d 415.
9. Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 416.
10. Dedes, 307 S.C. at 158, 414 S.E.2d at 136.
11. Id.
12. Caroprop, - S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
13. Caroprop, - S.C. at 429 S.E.2d at 198.
14. Id. at __, 429 S.E.2d at 198-99.
15. Id. at __, 429 S.E.2d at 198.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-118(e) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
17. Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 199.
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On appeal to the supreme court, Auten IRA did not dispute that it was
liable at law for the balance of the Interstate debt,18 but instead argued that
in equity it should be only secondarily liable.19 The thrust of Auten IRA's
argument was that the application of legal rules imposing primary liability on
Auten IRA would preclude all South Carolina codebtors from satisfying the
elements of equitable subrogation. Auten IRA asserted that the "degree of
liability" in equity is determined by the relationship between the parties, not
by the exact words of the instrument.2'
The South Carolina Supreme Court relied primarily on Dunn v.
Chapman2W ' where the plaintiff, also a mortgagor, conveyed mortgaged
premises in exchange for the grantee's assumption of the mortgage. In Dunn
the court relied on Walker v. Queen Insurance Co.' for the proposition that,
upon a mortgagor's conveyance, "the premises become[s] the primary fund out
of which the mortgage is collectible ... and 'the mortgagor (Dunn) then
becomes secondarily liable for the mortgage debt.'" ' The supreme court
applied the holding of Dunn to conclude that "the dispositive issue is not who
conveys the property, but that upon conveyance, it is the property itself, and
not the mortgagor, which becomes primarily liable. "24 Thus, upon the
conveyance of the property by Atlantic to Caroprop, Auten IRA became only
secondarily liable for payment of the note.' The supreme court then quickly
disposed of the fourth element, stating that First South knowingly took a
second mortgage from Caroprop and was in no way disadvantaged because it
did nothing to advance its priority.26 Finding that all the necessary elements
of equitable subrogation were met, the supreme court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals.2'
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court overruled two earlier court
of appeals decisions, Pee Dee State Bank v. Prosser28 and Jeffcoat v.
18. Id. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 198-99.
19. Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
20. Brief of Petitioner at 7. Auten IRA's argument was based on the following presumption:
Equity presupposed that each borrower, Auten and Atlantic, would repay its own
equal share of the Interstate debt. To the extent that either has repaid the debt share
of the other, the paying borrower has paid the share of "one who, in equity, justice,
and good conscience should pay" - or, in modem shorthand, the share for which the
paying borrower was only secondarily liable.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Surasky v. Weintraub, 90 S.C. 522, 535, 73 S.E. 1029, 1032 (1912)).
21. 149 S.C. 163, 146 S.E. 818 (1929).
22. 136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 263 (1926).
23. Dunn, 149 S.C. at 170-71, 146 S.E. at 821 (quoting Walker v. Queen, 136 S.C. 144,
158-59, 134 S.E. 263, 268 (1926) (italics omitted)).
24. Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
25. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
26. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 417.
27. Id. at __,446 S.E.2d at 417.
28. 295 S.C. 229, 238-39, 367 S.E.2d 708, 714 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that "[a] mortgagor
[Vol. 47
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/4
COMMERCIAL LAW
Morris,29 to the extent that they were inconsistent with its current opinion. 30
The court of appeals had relied on Prosser to find Auten IRA primarily liable,
and hence, not entitled to equitable subrogation.3' The court of appeals had
also referred to Jeffcoat as authority for finding no basis for equitable
subrogation.
32
The supreme court's reliance on Dunn is surprising. Neither party, nor
the court of appeals, had considered Dunn to be dispositive of the issues. In
fact, Auten IRA cited Dunn only to illustrate that equity determines whether
a party is primarily or secondarily liable by the relationship between the
debtors, not by the terms of the note or statute.33 First South also tried to
distinguish Dunn, arguing that because Dunn was not a cotenant, Dunn's
situation was not analogous to that of Auten IRA. 34 First South also noted
that while Dunn conveyed away his land, Auten IRA enjoyed possession of the
entire parcel as a tenant in common with Caroprop.35 The court of appeals
used Dunn to deny Auten IRA the right to equitable subrogation on the
premise that "equity will deny the right of subrogation to one who pays or has
paid a debt for which it was at the time primarily liable."
36
The disparity between the supreme court and the court of appeals opinions
may lie in their method of interpreting Dunn. The court of appeals applied a
strict interpretation that required Auten IRA to actually convey the premises
to become secondarily liable. In other words, Caroprop's conveyance of its
share did not cause Auten IRA to become secondarily liable, because in Dunn,
who pays off a prior mortgage may not keep it alive against later mortgagees ... by asking for
subrogation"), overruled by Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 415.
29. 300 S.C. 526, 529, 389 S.E.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[p]ayment of a
note by a maker ... operates to extinguish the note, discharging the liability of any co-makers
on the note"), overruled by Caroprop, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 415.
30. Caroprop, _ S.C. at , 446 S.E.2d at 417.
31. Caroprop, - S.C. at 429 S.E.2d at 198.
32. Id. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 199.
33. See Brief of Petitioner at 7-8. Auten IRA interpreted Dunn as meaning that "in equity,
the degree of liability, primary or secondary, can change with the circumstances and
events. . . ." Id. at 13. Auten IRA did not, however, identify Dunn as the solution to its
problem. In fact, Auten IRA denyied that "a conveyance generate[s] the secondary liability
condition." Id. at 9 n.7. Rather, Auten IRA argued that treatment of the purchase price, not the
conveyance of land, causes equity to "re-alignl the debt priorities of the parties to reflect fairness
in the substance of their dealings.. . ." Id. at 9.
34. See Brief of Respondent at 18.
35. Id. at 19. The point of this distinction, according to First South, was that Dunn's
secondary liability resulted from his exchange of possession of the property for the assumption
of his mortgage debt. Id. Such considerationwas arguably lacking in Auten IRA's case because
it was able to enjoy use of the entire undivided parcel. The supreme court did not, however,
recognize consideration as crucial to a mortgagor becoming secondarily liable.
36. Caroprop, _ S.C. at_, 429 S.E.2d at 199 (quoting Dunn v. Chapman, 149 S.C. 163,
169, 146 S.E. 818, 820 (1929)).
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the mortgagor who became secondarily liable was also the conveyor of the
premises. The supreme court interpreted Dunn more broadly and held that the
conveyance itself caused the premises to become primarily liable, imposing
only secondary liability on Auten IRA. By relying on Dunn and focusing on
the conveyance as the vehicle for resolving the tension between a cotenant
relationship and the rights of third parties, the court may have disregarded the
extent to which the relationship between cotenants affects degrees of liability
and, thus, the right to equitable subrogation.
Angela H. Stokes
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